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Abstract—We demonstrate an attack on the secure bootchain
of the Nintendo 3DS in order to gain early code execution.
The attack utilizes the block shuffling vulnerability of the ECB
cipher mode to rearrange keys in the Nintendo 3DS’s encrypted
keystore. Because the shuffled keys will deterministically decrypt
the encrypted firmware binary to incorrect plaintext data and
execute it, and because the device’s memory contents are kept
between hard reboots, it is possible to reliably reach a branching
instruction to a payload in memory. This payload, due to its
execution by a privileged processor and its early execution, is
able to extract the hash of hardware secrets necessary to decrypt
the device’s encrypted keystore and set up a persistent exploit of
the system.
Index Terms—Advanced Encryption Standard, keyshuffling,
bootchain, cryptography, block ciphers, software security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Nintendo 3DS, like all entertainment consoles, is in a
difficult position when it comes to designing a secure system.
The device must easily accommodate legitimate users while
at the same time preventing cheating, protecting intellectual
property, and enforcing system integrity. To accomplish this,
the 3DS has a chain of trust based on two separate proces-
sors: an ARM9 and an ARM11. The ARM9 processor is
a security processor that runs a single process (“Process9”)
whose sole responsibility is to handle secure functions such as
cryptography, filesystem access, and permissions. The ARM11
processor is an application processor which is responsible for
all OS and userspace-level tasks [1].
As with most embedded systems, the root of trust for the
3DS is the boot ROM burned into the System-on-Chip (“SoC”)
at the factory. The code in this Read Only Memory cannot be
changed and contains a public key to which only Nintendo has
the matching private key. When the device is powered on, each
CPU’s boot ROM loads their respective firmware binary from
NAND flash storage to memory, checks the firmware binary
for a valid RSA signature that matches the burned in public
key, then jumps to the firmware binary entrypoint [1]. This is
a simple, robust chain of trust that seems fairly secure upon
initial inspection.
In 2014, Nintendo released the “New 3DS” which this paper
will focus on. This updated 3DS features a faster CPU, more
RAM, and (most importantly) an extra encryption layer on
the ARM9 firmware binary known in the 3DS community as
“ARM9Loader”. This encryption layer loads new keys from
NAND sector 0x96 (the plaintext of which is the same for all
New 3DS devices), which are encrypted with AES-128-ECB
by a key calculated from a SHA-256 hash of the the console-
unique (different for every console) one-time programmable
(“OTP”) memory region of the device. Keys on the 3DS are
loaded into write-only “keyslots”, which are secure memory
areas readable only by the hardware AES implementation. This
means that it should not be possible to recover these keys after
they have been written to the AES module [2].
After ARM9Loader decrypts the NAND “keysector”, access
to the OTP memory region is disabled until next boot via
the hardware register CFG SYSPROT9. Once the OTP region
has been secured, ARM9Loader then decrypts the ARM9
firmware binary using a key from the decrypted keysector.
Additionally, the hash of the OTP memory region is outputted
to the SHA HASH hardware register after the hardware SHA
implementation calculates it [3]. Importantly, this register is
not cleared until the ARM9 firmware binary clears it after
ARM9Loader jumps to its entrypoint.
II. SECURE BOOTCHAIN IMPLEMENTATIONS
A. Implementation (v1.0)
The New 3DS shipped with version 8.1.0 of the system
software, which contains the following implementation of
ARM9Loader in the boot process [4]:
1) Calculate SHA-256 hash of the OTP memory region and
output the hash to the SHA HASH register
2) Calculate AES write-only keyslot 0x11 from the OTP
hash
3) Read the keysector from NAND to memory
4) Decrypt the keysector using keyslot 0x11
5) Clear AES write-only keyslot 0x11 to zero
6) Disable access to the OTP memory region by setting
CFG SYSPROT9
7) Write Key #1 from the keysector to AES write-only
keyslot 0x11
8) Instruct the AES module to calculate sub-keys 0x18
through 0x1F based on keyslot 0x11
9) Verify keyslot 0x11 by encrypting a fixed test vector and
checking the result
10) Instruct the AES module to decrypt the ARM9 firmware
binary
11) Jump to the ARM9 firmware binary entrypoint
The problem with this implementation of ARM9Loader is
that keyslot 0x11 was not cleared after decrypting the ARM9
firmware binary (before jumping to the entrypoint), and thus it
was possible to gain ARM9 code execution at a later point and
instruct the AES module to regenerate all of the secret sub-
keys without having access to the decrypted keysector. This
was partially fixed with the update 9.5.0 by clearing keyslot
0x11 after ARM9Loader decrypts the ARM9 firmware binary,
but keyslot 0x11 was still set with keysector Key #1 [5].
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2B. Implementation (v2.0)
The system software update 9.6.0 fixed the shortcomings
of the first ARM9Loader implementation by using a different
keysector key and clearing it properly this time. It contains the
following implementation of ARM9Loader in the boot process
[4]:
1) Calculate SHA-256 hash of the OTP memory region and
output the hash to the SHA HASH register
2) Calculate AES write-only keyslot 0x11 from the OTP
hash
3) Read the keysector from NAND to memory
4) Decrypt the keysector using keyslot 0x11
5) Clear AES write-only keyslot 0x11 to zero
6) Disable access to the OTP memory region by setting
CFG SYSPROT9
7) Decrypt a key from within ARM9Loader’s read-only
data and set that key to keyslot 0x18
8) Write Key #1 from the keysector to AES write-only
keyslot 0x11
9) Instruct the AES module to calculate sub-keys 0x19
through 0x1F based on keyslot 0x11
10) Verify keyslot 0x11 by encrypting a fixed test vector and
checking the result
11) Write Key #2 from the keysector to AES write-only
keyslot 0x11
12) Instruct the AES module to decrypt the ARM9 firmware
binary
13) Clear AES write-only keyslot 0x11 to zero
14) Jump to the ARM9 firmware binary entrypoint
The problem with this implementation of ARM9Loader is
that Key #2 is never verified by encrypting a fixed test vector
and checking the result, meaning that Key #2 can be altered
and the ARM9 firmware binary will be deterministically de-
crypted to incorrect plaintext data and executed. Unfortunately,
because the keysector is encrypted with the console unique
OTP hash (which we cannot access post-ARM9Loader), it
is not possible to arbitrarily write any key to it and get a
predictable decryption result [5].
III. KEYSHUFFLING
The keysector is encrypted with AES-128-ECB, where AES
is the encryption standard, 128 is the number of bits in a block,
and ECB is the cipher mode. The two parts of this specific
encryption method that interest us are the block size and the
cipher mode. The keys in the keysector are all 16 bytes (128
bits) long, and there is no message authentication code of any
kind to increase the size or validate the key positions. This is
a crucial fact because of the cipher mode used. In Electronic
Codebook (ECB), each block in the message (the keysector in
this case) is divided into blocks of the given size and encrypted
separately. This means that each key in the keysector aligns
with a block that is encrypted completely separately from all
of the other aligned keys, allowing us to move the keys into
any position we want while still decrypting properly.
Another critical aspect of this attack is that each version
of the ARM9 firmware binary is encrypted with a different
counter in AES-128-CTR mode, meaning that even code
that is the same between versions will decrypt to something
completely different for each key that we try. A NAND sector
on the device is 0x200 bytes and each key is 0x10 bytes. When
we do not count the Key #2 that properly decrypts the ARM9
firmware binary, which means we have 31 different keys for
each ARM9 firmware binary version that will all decrypt the
binary to a different incorrect plaintext which will then be
executed.
Fig. 1. Encoding of an ARM branch instruction [6]
If we try enough keys and ARM9 firmware binary versions,
there is a high probability that we will eventually find one
that decrypts the ARM9 firmware binary deterministically
such that the entrypoint is a branch instruction to another
memory address where a payload can be placed. We found, by
trying all possible keys and ARM9 firmware binary versions,
that there is one combination that causes a jump to a usable
memory location. By installing the 10.0.0 update of the ARM9
firmware binary and using the keyshuffling attack to replace
keysector Key #2 with a copy of keysector Key #1, the
resulting incorrect plaintext from the deterministic decryption
will have a jump to memory address 0x80FD0F8 at the
ARM9 firmware binary entrypoint. This redirects the code
flow outside of the secure bootchain and into manipulatable
memory.
To exploit this vulnerable redirection of code flow, we took
advantage of another major oversight in the device’s design:
when the device reboots, all memory keeps its contents. This
makes it possible for us to gain ARM9 code execution at a
point after the system boot completes, install the 10.0.0 update
of the ARM9 firmware binary, use keyshuffling to replace
keysector Key #2 with keysector Key #1, insert a series of NOP
instructions (“NOP sled”) at memory address 0x80FD0F8
followed by a payload that dumps the SHA HASH register,
then reboot.
When the device comes back up, the ARM9 boot ROM will
read ARM9Loader and the encrypted ARM9 firmware binary
to memory, then jump to ARM9Loader which will perform the
implementation v2.0 steps described previously. ARM9Loader
will then (incorrectly) attempt to decrypt the ARM9 firmware
with Key #2 (which is now identical to Key #1), disable access
to the OTP memory region by setting CFG SYSPROT9, and
jump to the ARM9 firmware binary entrypoint. When it does,
it will immediately jump to memory address 0x80FD0F8,
execute the series of NOP instructions and “slide” to the
payload. The payload then copies the hash of the OTP memory
region from the uncleared SHA HASH output register for the
purpose of decrypting the keysector at a later point.
3IV. PERSISTENCE
With the SHA-256 hash of the OTP memory region, we
are now able to decrypt or re-encrypt the keysector. This
means that we now completely control what key will be used
for decrypting the ARM9 firmware binary, rather than being
limited to one of the other 31 keys in the keysector. To
understand how controlling the location of memory jumped
to by ARM9Loader is useful in the context of persistence, we
must look at how the boot ROM loads ARM9Loader and the
firmware binary from NAND to memory.
On the 3DS, ARM9Loader and the ARM9 Firmware binary,
known collectively as “FIRM”, are stored twice on NAND
in two partitions known as “FIRM0” and “FIRM1” for re-
dundancy purposes. This means that if one firmware partition
becomes corrupted, the device will still boot. Note that the
FIRM partitions, as with most partitions on the device, are
encrypted using console unique keys derived from the OTP
and set by the boot ROM. The boot ROM uses the following
implementation to load FIRM0 and FIRM1 from NAND [7]
[8] [9]:
1) Decrypt the OTP memory region and store the first 0x90
bytes in Instruction Tightly-Coupled Memory (“ITCM”)
2) Calculate AES write-only keyslot 0x06 from decrypted
OTP memory region in ITCM
3) Read FIRM0 NAND partition to memory
4) Decrypt FIRM0 partition in memory using keyslot 0x06
5) Check the RSA signature of decrypted FIRM0 against
burned in public key
a) If the RSA signature is valid, jump to FIRM0
ARM9Loader entrypoint
b) If the RSA signature is invalid, continue
6) Read FIRM1 NAND partition to memory on top of
FIRM0
7) Decrypt FIRM1 partition in memory using keyslot 0x06
8) Check the RSA signature of decrypted FIRM1 against
burned in public key
a) If the RSA signature is valid, jump to FIRM1
ARM9Loader entrypoint
b) If the RSA signature is invalid, panic
The problem with this implementation is that, in the case of
a FIRM0 partition with an invalid signature, FIRM1 is loaded
on top of it without FIRM0’s memory being cleared [6]. This
allows for an attack in which we install the largest legitimately
signed ARM9 firmware binary available to us (8.1.0) into
FIRM0, then install the smallest legitimately signed ARM9
firmware binary available to us (10.2.0) into FIRM1. We could
then place a payload of our choosing on top of FIRM0 at a
point after FIRM1’s size and find a key whose deterministic
decryption of the 10.2.0 ARM9 firmware binary to a resulting
incorrect plaintext will have a branch instruction to memory
address after the end of the 10.2.0 ARM9 firmware binary but
within the size of the 8.1.0 ARM9 firmware binary [6].
We ran a bruteforce of all possible Key #2 values
until we found the key whose deterministic decryption
of the 8.1.0 FIRM0 ARM9 firmware binary to a result-
ing incorrect plaintext has a branch instruction to 0x190
bytes after the end of the 8.1.0 ARM9 firmware binary
(0x0824D3CB4AE94D624DAA526047C59394). We use
0x190 bytes after the end of the 8.1.0 ARM9 firmware
binary because empirical tests determined that placing the
payload any sooner caused the payload to be overwritten by
an unknown factor in the boot process (likely the stack or bss
segment). After finding this key, we encrypt it with the OTP
memory region hash obtained through the keyshuffling exploit
and install the encrypted key into keysector Key #2. We then
add 0x190 to the size of the 8.1.0 ARM9 firmware binary and
write a payload of our choosing to that position relative to the
10.2.0 ARM9 firmware binary [6].
When the device is rebooted, the boot ROM loads FIRM0
into memory and decrypts it with AES write-only keyslot
0x06. It then checks the RSA signature of decrypted FIRM0,
which fails because our payload at the end of the 8.1.0 ARM9
firmware binary has modified the hash. The boot ROM then,
without clearing the memory now containing our payload,
loads FIRM1 into memory on top of FIRM0 and decrypts
it with AES write-only keyslot 0x06 [7]. The boot ROM
checks the RSA signature of FIRM1, which passes because the
payload comes after the 10.2.0 ARM9 firmware binary. The
boot ROM then jumps to the FIRM1 ARM9Loader in memory
which uses our crafted Key #2 to deterministically decrypt the
10.2.0 ARM9 firmware binary to an incorrect plaintext and
jumps to its entrypoint. When it does, it will immediately jump
to the memory address of the payload of our choosing, giving
us ARM9 code execution on every successive boot before the
ARM9 firmware binary runs [6] [7].
V. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated a keyshuffling attack on the secure
bootchain of the Nintendo 3DS in order to redirect code flow
into insecure memory. This allowed us to gain code execution
early enough to extract hardware secrets for the purpose of
setting up persistent early code execution that survives reboots.
This attack was made possible through a hardware revision that
included the addition of a new encryption layer that not only
failed to provide extra security, but additionally compromised a
bootchain which had previously been considered secure. This
shows the danger of including new security measures in an
existing chain of trust without properly vetting them.
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